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Abstract
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a “fair”
way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free
allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of
envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no
player prefers the bundle of another player following the removal of any single good, and prove
the first general results about this property. We use the leximin solution to show existence
of EFX allocations in several contexts, sometimes in conjunction with Pareto optimality. For
two players with valuations obeying a mild assumption, one of these results provides stronger
guarantees than the currently deployed algorithm on Spliddit, a popular fair division website.
Unfortunately, finding the leximin solution can require exponential time. We show that this
is necessary by proving an exponential lower bound on the number of value queries needed to
identify an EFX allocation, even for two players with identical valuations. We consider both
additive and more general valuations, and our work suggests that there is a rich landscape
of problems to explore in the fair division of indivisible goods with different classes of player
valuations.
1 Introduction
Fair division has a long history, with the earliest known mechanism for solving the problem dating
back to the Bible. No, not war; the cut-and-choose protocol. When Abraham and Lot first arrive
in the land of Canaan, Abraham suggests that they divide the land between them. Abraham
partitions the land into two parts and lets Lot choose which part he would like to keep.
What makes this procedure fair? By dividing the land into two pieces he values equally, Abra-
ham can ensure that he will not envy Lot’s piece, regardless of which piece Lot takes. Since Lot
presumably chooses his favorite piece, he will not envy Abraham. This means that the cut-and-
choose protocol guarantees an envy-free allocation, meaning that each player likes their allocation
at least as much as any other player’s allocation.
The cut-and-choose protocol is defined for two players and divisible goods, meaning that each
good can be divided into arbitrarily small pieces. In this paper, we consider the setting of indivisible
goods, meaning that the resource in question is a set of discrete goods, each of which must be wholly
allocated to a single player. Unfortunately, envy-freeness cannot be guaranteed in this setting. We
see this even with two players and a single good: one player must receive the good, and the other
will surely be envious.
Consequently, other notions of fairness are needed. Budish [7] introduced the concept of envy-
freeness up to one good (EF1). In an EF1 allocation, player i may envy player j, but the envy
could be eliminated by removing a single good from player j’s allocation. The good is not actually
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removed; this is a thought experiment used in the definition of envy-freeness up to one good. An
EF1 allocation always exists, and can be computed in polynomial time [20].1
Caragiannis et al. [10] proposed another fairness criterion, one which is strictly stronger than
EF1, but strictly weaker than full envy-freeness. An allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX)
if for any i, j where player i envies player j, removing any good from j’s allocation would eliminate
i’s envy. Do EFX allocations always exist? This paper takes the first steps toward answering this
question.
1.1 Applications
The non-profit website Spliddit (www.spliddit.org) is one of the most promising applications of
fair division theory [17]. Spliddit implements mechanisms for several fair division problems: rent
division [16], taxi fare division, credit assignment (i.e., for a group project or academic paper) [11],
task distribution [25, 9], and distribution of indivisible goods. These mechanisms are available for
public use at no cost: users can simply log in, define what is to be divided, and enter their valuations.
Since the site’s launch in November 2014, there have been over 60,000 users [10]. The company
Fair Outcomes, Inc. (http://www.fairoutcomes.com) offers fair division services in a similar vein.
Another compelling fair division application is allocating courses among students. Students
have preferences regarding which courses they would like to take, but each course has a limited
capacity. The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania now uses a theoretically-grounded
mechanism titled Course Match to fairly allocate courses among MBA students, which has led to
demonstrably higher satisfaction and perceived fairness among students [7, 8].
A major selling point of these services is that their solutions are guaranteed to satisfy certain
fairness properties. For example, in the case of distribution of indivisible goods on Spliddit, users
know that the solution will be envy-free up to one good and Pareto optimal [10]. Our hope is
that further work in the area of fair division of indivisible goods will allow user-facing services like
Spliddit, Fair Outcomes, Inc., and Course Match to offer users even stronger fairness guarantees.
1.2 Prior work
A detailed survey of the fair division literature is outside the scope of this paper, and we discuss
only the works most closely related to ours. See e.g., [5, 23, 6] for further background.
Lipton et al. [20] gave an algorithm whose solution is guaranteed to be EF1 for general valu-
ations. By a valuation, we mean a function specifying a player’s value for each bundle she might
receive. By general, we mean that the only assumptions imposed on valuation functions are nor-
malization (the value of the empty set is 0), and monotonicity (adding goods to a bundle cannot
make it worse).
Their algorithm allocates the goods in rounds and ensures that the partial allocation at the end
of each round is EF1. At the beginning of each round, an unenvied player is identified; if no such
player exists, there must be a cycle of envy, and bundles can be swapped along such cycles until no
cycles of envy remain. An arbitrary good is then given to this unenvied player. This player may
become envied after receiving this good, but the envy could be eliminated by removing the good
she just received (since she was unenvied prior to receiving that good). This ensures that whenever
player i envies player j, the envy could be eliminated by removing the most recent good given to
player j, so the resulting allocation is EF1.
1The algorithm of [20] was originally published in 2004 with a different property in mind, as the EF1 property
was not proposed until 2011 by [7].
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n = 2, add n = 2, gen n ≥ 2, gen + id n > 2, add n > 2, gen
1
2 EFX ✓ (Thm. 4.3) ✓ (Thm. 4.3) ✓ (Thm. 4.2) ✓ (Thm. 6.1) ?
EFX ✓ (Thm. 4.3) ✓ (Thm. 4.3) ✓ (Thm. 4.2) ? ?
EFX + PO (nmu) ✓ (Thm. 5.5) ✗ (Thm. 5.6) ✓ (Thm. 5.4) ? ✗ (Thm. 5.6)
Table 1: A summary of our existence results. Here n is the number of players. “add”, “gen”,
“id”, and “nmu” refer to additive valuations, general valuations, identical valuations, and nonzero
marginal utility, respectively. “✓” indicates that the type of allocation specified by the row is
guaranteed to exist in the setting specified by the column, while “✗” indicates that we give a
counterexample, and “?” indicates an open question.
Caragiannis et al. [10] studied the case where valuations are additive, meaning that each player’s
value for a set of goods is the sum of her values for the individual goods. They showed that the
allocation maximizing the product of players’ utilities (the maximum Nash welfare solution) is
guaranteed to be both EF1 and Pareto optimal, assuming valuations are additive. In contrast, the
algorithm of Lipton et al. [20] does not guarantee a Pareto optimal allocation.2
Caragiannis et al. [10] also proposed the fairness criterion of envy-freeness up to any good, and
left the possible existence of EFX allocations as an open problem. We are not aware of any results
regarding EFX allocations prior to this work.
We briefly describe several other models for fair division of indivisible goods. Brams et al. [4]
and Aziz et al. [1] assumed that players express only an ordinal ranking over the goods, as opposed
to exact values. Certain tasks become easier in this domain, but important information is arguably
lost by only considering rankings. Randomized allocations have also been considered (e.g., [2, 9]),
but this is not suitable for the applications we are most interested in, where the outcome is only
used once. Dickerson et al. [12] took a probabilistic approach, and showed that envy-free allocations
are likely to exist when the number of goods is at least a logarithmic factor larger than the number
of players. While illuminating, this does not directly bear on our goal: determining when fair
allocations are guaranteed to exist, and how they can be computed.
1.3 Our contributions
We consider the EFX property in a variety of contexts; our main existence results are given in
Table 1.
1.3.1 Exponential query complexity lower bound
Section 3 presents our most technically involved result: an exponential lower bound on the number
of value queries required by a deterministic algorithm to find an EFX allocation. This is done
via a reduction from local search on a class of graphs known as the Odd graphs, for which we
prove an exponential lower bound. In combination with results due to Dinh and Russell [13] and
Valencia-Pabon and Vera [30], this yields an analogous exponential lower bound for randomized
2Suppose there are two players with additive valuations v1, v2 over three goods, a, b, c, where v1({a}) = 3, v1({b}) =
2, v1({c}) = 4 and v2({a}) = 4, v2({b}) = 3, v2({c}) = 2. The algorithm of Lipton et al. [20] could first allocate a to
player 1, then b to player 2, and finally c also to player 2. The resulting allocation is EF1, but giving {c} to player 1
and {a, b} to player 2 would be better for both players.
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algorithms. Dobzinski et al. [14] also use a local search reduction to prove a lower bound on the
number of value queries required to find a certain type of equilibrium in a simultaneous second
price auction, for bidders with XOS (i.e., fractionally subadditive) valuations. We hope that this
lower bound technique will be useful in other contexts as well.
Our lower bound holds even for two players with identical submodular valuations. In stark
contrast, the algorithm of Lipton et al. [20] finds an EF1 allocation in polynomial time for general
and possibly distinct valuations, and for any number of players. This suggests that EFX is indeed
a significantly stronger fairness guarantee than EF1, and deserves further study.
1.3.2 Positive EFX results
Many of our positive results rely on the leximin solution. The leximin (a portmanteau of “lexi-
cographic” and “maximin”) solution selects the allocation which maximizes the minimum utility;
then, if there are multiple allocations which achieve that minimum utility, it chooses among those
the allocation which maximizes the second minimum utility, and so on. The leximin solution was
developed as a metric of fairness in and of itself [27, 28, 29], and has been used before in fair
division, though typically for randomized allocations (e.g. [2]).
In Section 4, we show that when players have general but identical valuations, a modification
of the leximin solution is EFX. By identical valuations, we mean that all players have the same
valuation. This result also yields a cut-and-choose-based protocol for two players with general and
possibly distinct valuations that is guaranteed to produce an EFX allocation. This is consistent
with our exponential lower bound, as it is well known that finding the leximin solution can require
exponential time for general valuations (e.g. [15]).3
These positive results contrast with the state-of-the-art for possibly distinct valuations and
three or more players, where even for additive valuations, the guaranteed existence of an EFX
allocation remains an open question (“despite significant effort,” according to [10]).
1.3.3 EFX and Pareto optimality
In Section 5, we consider Pareto optimality. In economics, an outcome is Pareto optimal (PO) if
there is no way to make one player better off without making another player worse off. We show
that even in simple cases, it is possible that no EFX allocation is also PO. However, these cases
rely on a player having zero value for a good being added to her bundle.
We propose the assumption that adding a good to a player’s bundle strictly improves the player’s
value for that bundle, and refer to this as “nonzero marginal utility”. We view this as quite a weak
assumption: especially in real-world settings, one might expect a player to always prefer to have a
good than not.
Under this assumption, we show that for two players with additive valuations, the leximin
solution is both EFX and PO.4 We also show that for any number of players with general but
identical valuations, the leximin solution is EFX and PO. Finally, we give a counterexample where
for two players with distinct general valuations, no EFX allocation is PO (even assuming nonzero
marginal utility).
3We mention that Appendix Section B shows that for two players with additive valuations, an EFX allocation can
be computed in polynomial time by a different method.
4When discussing the leximin solution for players with different valuations, we assume that each player’s value for
the entire set of goods is the same: were this not true, we could simply rescale the valuations as needed and use the
leximin solution over the rescaled valuations.
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a b c
player 1 5 3 1
player 2 5 1 3
Figure 1: An instance where our algorithm provides stronger guarantees than the algorithm cur-
rently deployed on Spliddit. Here two players have additive valuations over three goods, a, b, and c.
By symmetry, assume a is given to player 1. Spliddit selects the maximum Nash welfare solution,
which gives {a, b} to player 1 and {c} to player 2. This is EF1 and PO, but not EFX, since player 2
would still envy player 1 after the removal of b. Our algorithm returns the unique (up to symmetry)
EFX and PO allocation, which gives {a} to player 1 and {b, c} to player 2.
1.3.4 Comparison to Spliddit in the two player case
Perhaps of most practical importance is our result that for two players with additive valuations
and nonzero marginal utility, the leximin solution is both EFX and PO. This provides stronger
guarantees than the currently deployed algorithm on Spliddit, which selects the maximum Nash
welfare solution, and only guarantees an allocation which is EF1 and PO.5
This manifests even in simple examples, such as the instance given by Figure 1. By symmetry,
assume that player 1 receives good a. The maximum Nash welfare solution selects the allocation
which maximizes the product of utilities: in this case, that would give player 1 a and b, and player
2 only c. This allocation is EF1, because player 2 would not envy player 1 if good a were removed
from player 1’s bundle. However, the allocation is not EFX, because player 2 would envy player 1
even if good b were removed from player 1’s bundle.
In contrast, our algorithm returns the unique (up to symmetry) EFX and PO allocation, which
gives a to player 1 and b and c to player 2. We suggest that this is also the more intuitively fair
allocation. Furthermore, the assumption of nonzero marginal utility seems especially reasonable in
the case of two players with additive valuations: if a player is truly indifferent to some good, one
could imagine simply giving that good to the other player and excluding it from the fair division
process entirely.6 We do note that Spliddit’s current algorithm does not require the assumption
of nonzero marginal utility, however. Neither approach has a clear advantage in terms of compu-
tational efficiency: both the leximin solution and maximum Nash welfare solution are NP-hard to
compute, even for two players with additive valuations.7
Finally, in Section 6 we propose an approximate version of EFX, and show that a 12 -EFX
allocation always exists when players have subadditive (possibly distinct) valuations.
More broadly, our results span additive, submodular, subadditive, and general valuations, and
identify separations between these classes from a fair division perspective. For example, we show
that assuming nonzero marginal utility and two players with additive valuations, an allocation which
is both EFX and PO is guaranteed to exist, while there is a counterexample for two players with
general valuations. Such valuation classes have already played a central role in the development of
algorithmic mechanism design over the past 15 years (e.g. [19]), and they may well prove equally
important in the fair division of indivisible goods.
5Spliddit only considers additive valuations. This is because each user need only report m values to specify an
entire additive valuation; in contrast, an exponential number of values can be required to specify a general valuation.
6A vindictive player might object to this: she may be unhappy with the other player receiving a good “for free”,
even if she has zero value for the good herself. We argue that this constitutes having nonzero value for the good, and
that a player has zero value for a good only if she is truly indifferent.
7For two players with identical additive valuations, the leximin solution gives each player half the total value if
and only if the valuation is a “yes” instance of the partition problem. The reduction is less obvious for maximum
Nash welfare; see e.g. [26].
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2 Model
Let [k] denote the set {1, 2, ...k}. Let N = [n] be the set of players andM be the set of goods, where
m = |M |. We assume throughout the paper that goods are indivisible: a good may not be split
among multiple players. Each player i has a value for each subset of M , specified as a valuation
function vi : 2
M → R≥0. Throughout the paper, we assume normalization, meaning that vi(∅) = 0,
and monotonicity (a.k.a. “free disposal”), meaning that vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . When we
refer to “general valuations,” we mean the set of all valuations that satisfy these two properties.
A special type of valuation is an additive valuation, where vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}) for every
S ⊆M . Thus m parameters (one for each good) implicitly specify the 2m values of the valuation.
The majority of the literature on computational fair division, with both divisible and indivisible
goods, focuses on additive valuations. There are also many interesting subclasses of valuations that
generalize additive valuations. For example, our main lower bound result (Theorem 3.3) holds for
submodular valuations, which are valuation functions v that satisfy “diminishing returns”:
v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {x}) − v(T )
for every S ⊆ T and x /∈ T . One of our positive results, Theorem 6.1, will hold for subadditive
valuations. A valuation v is subadditive if
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T )
Every additive valuation is submodular, and every submodular valuation is subadditive.
An allocation A is a partition ofM into n disjoint subsets, (A1, A2...An), where Ai is the bundle
given to player i. We refer to an allocation as partial if only a subset S ⊆ M of the goods are
allocated. When “partial” is omitted, it means that all goods have been allocated.
Our objective is to find a “fair” allocation. Many different notions of fairness have been studied,
with envy-freeness being one of the most prominent (see e.g., [5, 23, 6] for further background).
Definition 2.1. An allocation A is envy-free if for all i and j,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj).
We say that i envies j if vi(Ai) < vi(Aj). Unfortunately, an envy-free allocation does not always
exist in the context of indivisible goods. This is clear even with two players and one good: the
player who does not receive the good will envy the other, assuming they both have nonzero value
for the good. Furthermore, determining whether an envy-free allocation exists is NP-complete [3]:
with two players and identical additive valuations, this is the partition problem.
Consequently, a relaxed version of envy-freeness has been studied, called envy-freeness up to
one good [7, 10].
Definition 2.2. An allocation A is envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for all i, j where i envies
j,8
∃ g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj\{g}).
That is, i may envy j, but there is a good in j’s bundle such that if it were removed, i would
no longer envy j. An EF1 allocation always exists, and can be computed in polynomial time, even
for general valuations [20].
8The “where i envies j” clause is necessary, or the condition would technically fail when Aj = ∅. This is not an
issue for the definition of EFX, however.
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Furthermore, Caragiannis et al. [10] showed that for additive valuations, an allocation which
is both EF1 and Pareto optimal always exists; in particular, the maximum Nash welfare solution
[24, 18, 26] is guaranteed to satisfy both properties. Caragiannis et al. [10] also proposed a new
fairness notion, one which is strictly weaker than envy-freeness, but strictly stronger than EF1.
Definition 2.3. An allocation A is envy-free up to any good (EFX) if, for all i, j,
∀g ∈ Aj , vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj\{g}).
In words, EFX demands that removing any good from j’s bundle would guarantee that i does
not envy j. Next, we define the standard notion of Pareto optimality.
Definition 2.4. An allocation A is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation B where
∀i ∈ [n], vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai), and
∃j ∈ [n], vj(Bj) > vj(Aj)
Finally, we define an approximate version of EFX. In Section 6, we will give an algorithm which
produces a 12 -EFX allocation for any number of players with subadditive valuations.
Definition 2.5. An allocation A is c-EFX if for all i, j,
∀g ∈ Aj , vi(Ai) ≥ c · vi(Aj\{g})
where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
3 Query complexity lower bound
We begin with our most technically involved result: an exponential lower bound on the number of
value queries required by any deterministic algorithm to compute an EFX allocation. Our lower
bound will hold even for two players, and even if their valuations are restricted to be identical and
submodular.9
In Section 3.1, we introduce the local search problem that we will reduce from. In Section 3.2, we
prove that finding an EFX allocation is at least as hard as solving local search on a particular class
of graphs. In Section 3.3, we show that any deterministic algorithm which finds a local maximum
on this class of graphs requires an exponential number of queries. This will imply that the problem
of finding an EFX allocation has exponential query complexity as well. Finally, in Section 3.4, we
extend this lower bound to randomized algorithms.
3.1 Local search
The Local Search problem takes as input an undirected graph G = (V,E) and an oracle function
f : V → R. The goal is to find a local maximum a ∈ V , where f(a) ≥ f(b) for all (a, b) ∈ E. Since
there exists a global maximum, there must exist at least one local maximum. We are interested
in the number of queries required to find a local maximum, where a query to a ∈ V returns f(a).
Queries are the only method by which an algorithm can discover information about f (i.e., it is
given as a “black box”). All other operations are free in this model—we count only the number
9There is of course no hope for an exponential lower bound for additive valuations, since m value queries suffice
to reconstruct an entire additive valuation.
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of queries. Queries can be adaptive, with an algorithm’s choice of which vertex to query next
depending on the results of previous queries.
For a graph G, the deterministic query complexity of Local Search on G is the minimum
number of queries required by any deterministic algorithm to solve Local Search on G (for a
worst-case choice of f). Formally, let D[LS(G)] be the deterministic query complexity of Local
Search on G. Then D[LS(G)] = min
Γ
max
f
TLS(G, f,Γ), where the minimizer ranges over all
deterministic algorithms Γ, the maximizer ranges over all functions f : V → R, and TLS(G, f,Γ) is
the number of queries used by the algorithm Γ to find a local maximum of f on G.
The difficulty of local search depends on the graph G. The Kneser graph K(n, k) is the graph
whose vertices are the size k subsets of [n], where two vertices are adjacent if and only if their
corresponding subsets are disjoint. The star of our lower bound argument is the Odd graph, K(2k+
1, k). The most famous Odd graph is the Petersen graph (Figure 2).
3.2 Local search on K(2k + 1, k) reduces to finding an EFX allocation
The EFX Allocation problem takes as input the set of players N = [n], the set of goods
M = [m], and a list of valuations (v1, v2, . . . , vn). In general, the goal is to find an EFX allocation,
or determine that none exists. The only method by which an algorithm can discover information
about the vi’s is through value queries, where upon querying the valuation vi at the set S, the
algorithm learns vi(S). Our lower bound applies even for a version of the problem that we will
show to be total (Theorem 4.2), meaning that an EFX allocation is guaranteed to exist.
Consider the special case of the EFX Allocation problem where all valuations are identical.
We will show in Section 4 that an EFX allocation is guaranteed to exist in this setting. We can
define the deterministic query complexity D[EFXid(n,m)] as the minimum number of queries
required to find an EFX allocation for a set of players N = [n] and a set of goods M = [m], given
a single valuation v where an EFX allocation is known to exist. Formally, D[EFXid(n,m)] =
min
Γ
max
v
TEFX(N,M, v,Γ), where TEFX(N,M, v,Γ) denotes the number of queries required by the
algorithm Γ to find an EFX allocation for players N with valuation v over goods M . Since this is a
special case of the general EFX Allocation problem, the deterministic query complexity of the
general EFX allocation problem is at least D[EFXid(n,m)].
We now state and prove our main result of Section 3.2. We will use M = [2k + 1] for some
integer k.
Theorem 3.1. The deterministic query complexity of the EFX Allocation problem satisfies
D[EFXid(2, 2k + 1)] ≥ D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))],
even for two players with identical submodular valuations.
Proof. Let T = D[EFXid(2, 2k+1)]; then there exists an algorithm Γ for finding an EFX allocation
which uses at most T queries, regardless of v. We will construct an algorithm Γ′ for Local Search
which also uses at most T queries, regardless of f . Formally, max
v
TEFX({1, 2},M, v,Γ) = T , and
we will construct Γ′ such that max
f
TLS(K(2k + 1, k), f,Γ
′) ≤ T .
Define the algorithm Γ′ on input (K(2k+1, k), f) as follows. For each S ⊆ [2k+1], define v(S)
as
v(S) =


2|S| if |S| < k
2k −
1
1 + e(f(S))
if |S| = k
2k if |S| > k.
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Then run Γ on ({1, 2}, [2k + 1], v) to obtain an EFX allocation (A1, A2), and return A1 if |A1| <
|A2| and A2 otherwise. We will show that the returned set corresponds to a local maximum in
K(2k + 1, k) (see Figure 2).
{1, 3}
{2, 4}
{3, 5}{4, 1}
{5, 2}
{4, 5}
{5, 1}
{1, 2}{2, 3}
{3, 4}
Figure 2: The graph shown is K(2k + 1, k) for k = 2, also known as the Petersen graph. Each
vertex corresponds to a size 2 subset of [5]. Suppose the allocation where A1 = {1, 2, 3} and
A2 = {4, 5} is EFX. Since v(S1) ≥ v(S2) if and only if f(S1) ≥ f(S2), we have f({4, 5}) ≥ f({1, 2}),
f({4, 5}) ≥ f({2, 3}), and f({4, 5}) ≥ f({1, 3}). Therefore {4,5} is a local maximum in this graph.
For brevity, define
δ(S) = −
1
1 + ef(S)
.
We note that −1 < δ(S) < 0 for all S, and that δ(S) is strictly increasing with f(S). Any other
function satisfying these properties would work as well.
We first argue that any EFX allocation returned by Γ must give one player exactly k goods.
Suppose that this were not the case. Then one player must receive fewer than k goods; without loss
of generality, assume |A2| < k, and thus |A1| > k + 1. Therefore v(A2) ≤ 2k − 2 and v(A1) = 2k.
For an arbitrary g ∈ A1, we have |A1\{g}| > k. Therefore there exists a g ∈ A1 such that
v(A1\{g}) = 2k > v(A2), so the allocation cannot be EFX. Thus any EFX allocation must give
one player exactly k goods. Therefore Γ will return a set of size k, which corresponds to a valid
vertex of K(2k + 1, k).
Without loss of generality, assume |A1| = k + 1 and |A2| = k. Then v(A1) = 2k and v(A2) =
2k + δ(A2) < 2k, so v(A1) > v(A2). Therefore the allocation A = (A1, A2) is EFX if and only if
v(A2) ≥ v(A1\{g}) for all g ∈ A1.
We can rewrite this condition as v(A2) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ A1 where |S| = k. For any |S| = k,
we have v(A2)−v(S) = δ(A2)−δ(S). Since δ is strictly increasing with f(S), we have v(A2) ≥ v(S)
if and only if f(A2) ≥ f(S). Therefore an allocation (A1, A2) is EFX if and only if f(A2) ≥ f(S)
for all S ⊆ A1 where |S| = k.
Observe that S ⊆ A1 if and only if S ∩A2 = ∅. Therefore an allocation (A1, A2) is EFX if and
only if f(A2) ≥ f(S) for all S ⊆M where |S| = k and S ∩A2 = ∅. This is exactly the definition of
A2 being a local maximum in K(2k + 1, k). Therefore an allocation (A1, A2) is EFX if and only if
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A2 is a local maximum in K(2k + 1, k).
Thus Γ′ correctly solves Local Search. Furthermore, since Γ′ uses no queries outside of
running Γ, and Γ uses at most T queries, Γ′ also uses at most T queries. Therefore
D[EFXid(2, 2k + 1)] ≥ D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))].
It remains to show that v is submodular. For any S ⊆M and x ∈M\S, we have
v(S ∪ {x})− v(S) =


2 if |S ∪ {x}| < k
2 + δ(S ∪ {x}) if |S ∪ {x}| = k
−δ(S) if |S ∪ {x}| = k + 1
0 if |S ∪ {x}| > k + 1.
Therefore v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S) is non-increasing with |S|, since −1 < δ(S) < 0 for all S. Thus
v(X ∪ {x}) − v(X) ≥ v(Y ∪ {x}) − v(Y ) whenever |X| < |Y |. If X ⊆ Y , either |X| < |Y | or
X = Y . When X = Y , we trivially have v(X ∪ {x}) − v(X) = v(Y ∪ {x}) − v(Y ). Thus we have
v(X ∪ {x}) − v(X) ≥ v(Y ∪ {x})− v(Y ) whenever X ⊆ Y , and so v is submodular.
3.3 Query complexity of local search on Odd graphs
In this section, we show that finding a local maximum on K(2k+1, k) has exponential query com-
plexity, completing our lower bound on the number of queries required to find an EFX allocation.10
3.3.1 The role of boundaries
For a graph G = (V,E) and a set S ⊆ V , define the boundary B(S) of S as the set of vertices that are
not in S but are adjacent to a vertex in S. Formally, B(S) = {a ∈ V \S : ∃b ∈ S, (a, b) ∈ E}. The
next result, due to [21], implies that local search is hard in graphs that only have large boundaries.
Lemma 3.1 ([21]). For any graph G = (V,E) and integers t and c,
D[LS(G)] ≥ min
(
t,min
S
{|B(S)| : c− t ≤ |S| ≤ c}
)
.
Proof Sketch. We sketch a proof for the benefit of the reader. The proof follows an adversary
argument. Let Gu be the subgraph induced by the still-unqueried vertices. While Gu remains
connected, suppose the adversary simply returns increasing values for each query. Then the only
way for a local maximum to be created is to query a vertex a after querying all of a’s neighbors.
Furthermore, while Gu remains connected and contains at least one unqueried vertex, the
most recently queried vertex a must have an unqueried neighbor b: if not, Gu must have been
disconnected prior to the most recent query. The adversary is free to toggle which of a and b is a
local maximum (or possibly neither, if there are more unqueried vertices). Thus while at least one
vertex has not been queried and the graph of unqueried vertices remains connected, it cannot be
determined where the graph has a local maximum.
Thus the only strategy to counteract the adversary is to perform a sort of binary search. First,
we must disconnect the graph of unqueried vertices. At least one of the resulting components must
contain a local maximum, and Llewellyn et al. [21] show how we can always identify one such
component based on the query results so far. Thus we can recurse on that component, and the
10A similar lower bound for local search on K(2k + 1, k) was proved (using different arguments) in [14].
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process repeats. Llewellyn et al. [21] call this the separation game. An example of the separation
game being played on a path is given by Figure 3.
By this logic, we will have to eventually disconnect a “fairly large” component: if it is too
small, the adversary is free to place the local maximum in another larger component. Specifically,
Llewellyn et al. [21] show that for any integers t and c, the adversary can force us to either query
t vertices, or disconnect a set of vertices S where c− t ≤ |S| ≤ c.
In order to disconnect a set of vertices S, every vertex on the boundary of S must be queried.
Thus at least min
(
t,min
S
{|B(S)| : c− t ≤ |S| ≤ c}
)
must be queried, as claimed.
3 2
1 5 3 2
1 5 4 3 2
Figure 3: An example of the separation game played on a path. After two central vertices are
queried, returning values 3 and 2 as shown, we know that there must be a local maximum in the
left half. Next, we bisect the left half by querying two more vertices, which return values 1 and 5.
At this point, we know that either the vertex with value 5 or the vertex immediately to its right
must be a local maximum, and only one more query is required to determine which. In this case,
the local maximum is the vertex with value 5.
3.3.2 Boundaries of Kneser graphs
In light of Lemma 3.1 and our interest in Kneser graphs, the natural next step it to understand
boundary sizes in Kneser graphs. The next lemma is due to Zheng [31].
Lemma 3.2 ([31]). Let µG(r) denote min
|S|=r
|B(S)|. Then for all 1 ≤ r ≤
(
n
k
)
,
µK(n,k)(r) ≥
(
n
k
)
−
1
r
(
n− 1
k − 1
)2
− r
We include a proof for completeness. In it, we make use of the following variant of the Erdo˝s-
Ko-Rado theorem. Call the set families X and Y cross-intersecting if X ∩Y 6= ∅ for all X ∈ X and
Y ∈ Y.
Lemma 3.3 ([22]). If X and Y are cross-intersecting families of size-k subsets of [n], then
|X ||Y| ≤
(
n− 1
k − 1
)2
Note that the inequality in Lemma 3.3 holds with equality (for k ≤ n/2) when X and Y both
consist of all subsets of size k that contain the element 1.
Proof. (Of Lemma 3.2.) For any S, we can partition V into S, B(S), and V \(S ∪ B(S)). An
example of this is shown in Figure 4. Consider an arbitrary a ∈ V \(S ∪ B(S)). We know that
a 6∈ S and a 6∈ B(S), so there is no b ∈ S where (a, b) ∈ E. Therefore for all a ∈ V \(S ∪B(S)) and
b ∈ S, a and b are not adjacent. Recall that a and b are adjacent in K(n, k) if a∩ b = ∅. Therefore
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Figure 4: The partitioning of an arbitrary graph into S, B(S), and V \(S ∪B(S)). In this example,
S is the set of pink vertices, B(S) is the set of blue vertices, and V \(S ∪ B(S)) is the set of gray
vertices.
for all a ∈ V \(S ∪ B(S)) and b ∈ S, a ∩ b 6= ∅. Thus S and V \(S ∪ B(S)) are cross-intersecting
families.
Therefore by Lemma 3.3, we have |S||V \(S ∪ B(S))| ≤
(
n− 1
k − 1
)2
. Let r = |S|. Then |V \(S ∪
B(S))| ≤
1
r
(
n− 1
k − 1
)2
. Therefore for all S,
|B(S)| = |V | − |V \(S ∪B(S))| − |S|
=
(
n
k
)
− |V \(S ∪B(S))| − r
≥
(
n
k
)
−
1
r
(
n− 1
k − 1
)2
− r
and so µK(n,k)(r) = min
|S|=r
|B(S)| ≥
(
n
k
)
−
1
r
(
n− 1
k − 1
)2
− r.
We will only be interested in K(2k + 1, k), so we will simply write
µ(r) = µK(2k+1,k)(r).
Similarly, let
β(r) =
(
2k + 1
k
)
−
1
r
(
2k
k − 1
)2
− r.
Then µ(r) ≥ β(r) for all r.
We next prove a lemma building on Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. Let rmax =
(
2k
k − 1
)
. Then for the graph K(2k + 1, k) and any r∗ ≤ rmax,
min
S
{|B(S)| : r∗ ≤ |S| ≤ rmax} ≥ β(r
∗)
Proof. We begin by examining the expression β(r)− β(r − 1):
β(r)− β(r − 1) = −
1
r
(
2k
k − 1
)2
− r +
1
r − 1
(
2k
k − 1
)2
+ r − 1
=
(
1
r − 1
−
1
r
)(
2k
k − 1
)2
− 1
=
1
r(r − 1)
(
2k
k − 1
)2
− 1.
Therefore β(r)− β(r− 1) ≥ 0 when r(r− 1) ≤
(
2k
k − 1
)2
. If r ≤ rmax, then r(r− 1) < r
2 ≤ r2max =(
2k
k − 1
)2
. Thus β(r) ≥ β(r − 1) when r ≤ rmax. Iterating this inequality yields β(r
∗) ≤ β(r)
whenever r∗ ≤ r ≤ rmax.
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We can rewrite min
S
{|B(S)| : r∗ ≤ |S| ≤ rmax} as
min
S
{|B(S)| : r∗ ≤ |S| ≤ rmax} = min
r: r∗≤r≤rmax
min
|S|=r
|B(S)|
= min
r: r∗≤r≤rmax
µ(r)
≥ min
r: r∗≤r≤rmax
β(r)
where the last step is due to Lemma 3.2. Since β(r∗) ≤ β(r) whenever r∗ ≤ r ≤ rmax, min
r: r∗≤r≤rmax
β(r) =
β(r∗). Therefore min
S
{|B(S)| : r∗ ≤ |S| ≤ rmax} ≥ β(r
∗), as required.
3.3.3 Local search on K(2k + 1, k)
We are now ready to prove our result on D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))].
Theorem 3.2. For all k,
D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))] ∈ Ω
(
1
k
(
2k + 1
k
))
.
Proof. Let c = rmax =
(
2k
k − 1
)
, and let t =
1
2k + 1
rmax. so c− t =
2k
2k + 1
rmax. Then by Lemma 3.1,
D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))] ≥
min
(
1
2k + 1
rmax,min
S
{
|B(S)| :
2k
2k + 1
rmax ≤ |S| ≤ rmax
})
By Lemma 3.4,
min
S
{
|B(S)| :
2k
2k + 1
rmax ≤ |S| ≤ rmax
}
≥ β
(
2k
2k + 1
rmax
)
=
(
2k + 1
k
)
−
2k + 1
2k · rmax
r2max −
2k
2k + 1
rmax
≥
(
2k + 1
k
)
−
(
2k + 1
2k
+ 1
)
rmax.
Using the identity
(
n
k
)
=
n
k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
for any n, k, we have
(
2k + 1
k
)
=
2k + 1
k
(
2k
k − 1
)
=
2k + 1
k
rmax.
Thus we have
min
S
{
|B(S)| :
2k
2k + 1
rmax ≤ |S| ≤ rmax
}
≥
(
2k + 1
k
−
2k + 1
2k
− 1
)
rmax
=
4k + 2− 2k − 1− 2k
2k
rmax
=
1
2k
rmax.
Therefore,
D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))] ≥ min
(
1
2k + 1
rmax,
1
2k
rmax
)
=
1
2k + 1
rmax
∈ Ω
(
1
k
rmax
)
.
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Since
(
2k + 1
k
)
=
2k + 1
k
rmax, we have
D[LS(K(2k + 1, k))] ∈ Ω
(
1
k
(
2k + 1
k
))
.
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 together imply our main result of Section 3.
Theorem 3.3. The deterministic query complexity of the EFX Allocation problem satisfies
D[EFXid(2, 2k + 1)] ∈ Ω
(
1
k
(
2k + 1
k
))
,
even for two players with identical submodular valuations.
3.4 Randomized query complexity
Our reduction from Local Search to EFX Allocation also yields an exponential lower bound
for randomized algorithms for free, thanks to results due to Dinh and Russell [13] and Valencia-
Pabon and Vera [30]. Let R[LS(G)] be the minimum number of queries required to solve Local
Search on G by a randomized algorithm: the algorithm should output a local maximum with
probability at least 2/3 (say) over its internal coin flips. Formally, R[LS(G)] = min
ΓR
max
f
T (G, f,ΓR),
where ΓR ranges over the set of randomized algorithms.
Similarly, let R[EFXid(2, 2k+1)] be the minimum number of queries required by a randomized
algorithm to find an EFX allocation for two players with identical valuations, and 2k + 1 goods
(again with correctness probability at least 2/3, say).
Theorem 3.4 ([13]). If G = (V,E) is a vertex transitive graph with diameter d, then
R[LS(G)] ∈ Ω
( √|V |
d · log |V |
)
Since K(2k + 1, k) is vertex transitive, the last piece of the puzzle is the following theorem,
Theorem 3.5 ([30]). The diameter of K(2k + 1, k) is k.
With these two tools in hand, Theorem 3.6 requires only a short proof.
Theorem 3.6. The randomized query complexity of the EFX Allocation problem satisfies
R[EFXid(2, 2k + 1)] ∈ Ω
(√(
2k + 1
k
)
1
k2
)
even for two players with identical submodular valuations.
Proof. Since |V | =
(
2k + 1
k
)
and log
((
2k + 1
k
))
∈ O(log(4k)) = O(k), we have
R[LS(K(2k + 1, k))] ∈ Ω
(√(
2k + 1
k
)
1
dk
)
by Theorem 3.4. Thus by Theorem 3.5, we have
R[LS(K(2k + 1, k))] ∈ Ω
(√(
2k + 1
k
)
1
k2
)
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The reduction used to prove that D[EFXid(2, 2k +1)] ≥ D[LS(K(2k+1, k))] can equivalently
be used to show that
R[EFXid(2, 2k + 1)] ≥ R[LS(K(2k + 1, k))].
Therefore R[EFXid(2, 2k + 1)] ∈ Ω
(√(
2k + 1
k
)
1
k2
)
.
While this bound is not as strong as our deterministic lower bound (Theorem 3.3), it does
establish that even a randomized algorithm requires an exponential number of queries to find an
EFX allocation.
4 Existence of EFX allocations for general but identical valuations
We mentioned in the previous section that an EFX allocation is guaranteed to exist when all players
have the same valuation: this section proves that claim. Specifically, we show that a modified version
of the leximin solution is guaranteed to be EFX for general but identical valutions. This also yields
a cut-and-choose-based protocol for two players with general and possibly distinct valuations.
4.1 The leximin solution
The leximin solution selects the allocation which maximizes the minimum utility of any player. If
there are multiple allocations which achieve that minimum utility, it chooses among those the one
which maximizes the second minimum utility, and so on. This implicitly specifies a comparison
operator ≺, which is given by Algorithm 1, and constitutes a total ordering over allocations.
The operator ≺ takes as input two allocations A and B, and the list of player valuations (v1...vn).
The players are ordered by utility, and according to some arbitrary but consistent tiebreak for
players with the same utility (for example, by player index). The comparison terminates when the
ℓth player in A’s ordering XA has different utility from the ℓth player in B′s ordering XB .
The leximin solution is the global maximum under this ordering. The leximin solution is trivially
PO, since if it were possible to improve the utility of one player without decreasing the utility of
any other player, the new allocation would be strictly larger under ≺.
4.1.1 Standard leximin is not EFX
Unfortunately, the standard leximin solution is not always EFX, even for identical valuations.
Consider two players with the same (non-additive) valuation v over two goods a and b. Define v by
v(S) =


0 if S = {a}
1 if S = {b}
2 if S = {a, b}
By symmetry, suppose without loss of generality that player 1 receives good b. Define the
allocation A by A1 = {b} and A2 = {a}, and define the allocation B by B1 = {a, b} and B2 = ∅.
Since player 2 (the minimum utility player) is indifferent between A and B, leximin selects
allocation B because it maximizes the value of player 1 (the second minimum utility player).
However, A is EFX, while B is not: player 2 envies player 1 even after the removal of a from B1.
11
11This example will be relevant again in Section 5 as an instance where there is no allocation which is both EFX
and PO.
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Algorithm 1 Leximin and Leximin++ comparison operators
1: function LeximinCmp(A,B, (v1...vn)) ⊲ Returns true if A ≺ B (strictly)
2: XA ← ordering of players by increasing utility vi(Ai), then by some arbitrary but consistent
tiebreak method for players with the same utility
3: XB ← corresponding ordering of players under B
4: for each ℓ ∈ [n] do
5: i← XAℓ ⊲ ℓth player in the ordering XA
6: j ← XBℓ ⊲ ℓth player in the ordering XB
7: if vi(Ai) 6= vj(Bj) then
8: return vi(Ai) < vj(Bj)
9: return false ⊲ In this case, A and B are equal
function Leximin++Cmp(A,B, (v1...vn)) ⊲ Returns true if A ≺++ B (strictly)
2: XA ← same as in LeximinCmp
XB ← same as in LeximinCmp
4: for each ℓ ∈ [n] do
i← XAℓ
6: j ← XBℓ
if vi(Ai) 6= vj(Bj) then
8: return vi(Ai) < vj(Bj)
if |Ai| 6= |Bj| then
10: return |Ai| < |Bj |
return false
4.2 The leximin++ solution
Our fix is that after maximizing the minimum utility, we maximize the size of the bundle of the
player with minimum utility, before maximizing the second minimum utility. Then we maximize
the second minimum utility, followed by the size of the second minimum utility bundle, and so on.
Thus giving good a to the lower utility player (player 2) is preferable, and so the EFX allocation
A is chosen over B.
We call this the leximin++ solution. The leximin++ solution induces a comparison operator
≺++, also given in Algorithm 1. Similarly to ≺, the players are ordered by increasing utility, and
then according to an arbitrary but consistent tiebreak among players with the same utility.12 The
comparison terminates when the ℓth player in XA differs in utility or bundle size from the ℓth
player in XB , with utility being checked before bundle size.
It may not be immediately clear that ≺++ specifies a total ordering, but this is in fact the case.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 appears in Appendix Section A.
Theorem 4.1. The comparison operator ≺++ specifies a total ordering.
We are now ready to prove our main result of this section.
Theorem 4.2. For general but identical valuations, the leximin++ solution is EFX.
12The tiebreak method must be consistent to ensure that ≺++ is a total ordering. Consider two players with the
same valuation v, and a single good a where v({a}) = 0. Suppose a ∈ A1. Since both players have zero utility, if
the tiebreak method were not required to be consistent, both {1, 2} and {2, 1} would be valid player orderings for A.
Consider running A ≺++ A. If player 2 were considered first in the A on the left, and player 1 were considered first
in the A on the right, the operator would see that player 1 has a larger bundle than player 2, and return true.
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Algorithm 2 Find an EFX allocation for two players with general valuations via cut-and-choose
1: function CutAndChoose(m, v1, v2)
2: (A1, A2)← Leximin++Solution(2,m, v1) ⊲ Player 1 uses the leximin++ solution to cut,
3: if v2(A1) ≥ v2(A2) then ⊲ and player 2 chooses.
4: return (A2, A1)
5: else
6: return (A1, A2)
Proof. Let A be an allocation that is not EFX. We will show that A is not the leximin++ solution.
Since A is not EFX, there exist players i, j and g ∈ Aj where v(Ai) < v(Aj\{g}). Then any
player with utility mink v(Ak) must also have utility strictly less than v(Aj\{g}), so assume with
loss of generality that i = argmink v(Ak). If there are multiple players with minimum utility in
A, let i be the one considered last in the ordering XA, according to the arbitrary but consistent
tiebreak method.
Define a new allocation B where Bi = Ai ∪ {g}, Bj = Aj\{g}, and Bk = Ak for all k 6∈ {i, j}.
We will show that A ≺++ B.
Let S be the set of players appearing before i in XA. We know i is considered last among
the players with minimum utility by assumption, so S is exactly the set of players with minimum
utility, other than i. Note that neither i nor j are in S.
Since the only bundles that differ between allocations A and B are that of i and j, we have
Ak = Bk for all k ∈ S. Thus for all k ∈ S, v(Bk) = v(Ak) = v(Ai). Since v(Bj) > v(Ai), j must
occur after every player in S in XB .
Because Ai ⊂ Bi, we have v(Bi) ≥ v(Ai). If v(Bi) > v(Ai), i must occur after every player in
S in XB , since v(Bi) > v(Bk) for all k ∈ S. If v(Bi) = v(Ai), i is still considered after every player
in S according to the arbitrary but consistent tiebreak method. Thus i occurs after every player
in S in XB in either case, which shows that the first |S| players in XB are the players in S, in the
same order they occur in XA.
Therefore the leximin++ comparison will not have terminated before reaching position |S|+1 in
the orderings. Let T be the set of players appearing after i in XA: note that j ∈ T . By assumption,
of the players with minimum utility in A, i appears last in XA. Therefore all players after i in XA
do not have minimum utility, so v(Ak) > v(Ai) for all k ∈ T . Recall that v(Bj) > v(Ai) and that
for all k ∈ T\{j}, v(Bk) = v(Ak). Thus v(Bk) > v(Ai) for all k ∈ T .
We know that XA|S|+1 = i. If X
B
|S|+1 = i, we have |Ai| < |Bi| (and possibly also v(Ai) < v(Bi)),
so A ≺++ B returns true. If X
B
|S|+1 = k for some k 6= i, then k ∈ T . Therefore v(Ai) < v(Bk), so
A ≺++ B returns true in this case as well.
Since A ≺++ B, A cannot be the leximin++ solution. Therefore the leximin++ solution must
be EFX.
We now show how Theorem 4.2 can easily be used to find an EFX allocation for two players
with general and possibly distinct valuations.13 Our algorithm for this follows from the observation
that any player can partition the goods into k bundles that are mutually EFX from her viewpoint,
simply by computing the leximin++ solution with k copies of herself.
Algorithm 2 is a straightforward adaptation of the cut-and-choose protocol. Player 1 partitions
the goods into two bundles using the leximin++ solution, and player 2 chooses her favorite bundle.
13The two-player case is not trivial. For example, our lower bound in Theorem 3.3 already applies with two players
(even with identical valuations).
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Theorem 4.3. For two players with general (not necessarily identical) valuations, Algorithm 2
returns an EFX allocation.
Proof. By Theorem 4.2, the allocation is EFX from player 1’s viewpoint regardless of which bundle
she receives. Player 2 receives her favorite bundle, so the resulting allocation is EFX from her
viewpoint as well.
4.3 Limitations of leximin++
Unfortunately, the leximin++ solution may not be EFX when players have different valuations.
For example, consider two players with valuations v1(S) = |S| and v2(S) = ǫ|S|, for some small
ǫ > 0. As long as player 1 receives at least one good, she will have utility at least 1. However,
player 2 will always have utility less than 1 for a suitably small ǫ. Thus the leximin++ solution
gives a single good to player 1 and the rest to player 2, which will cause player 1 to envy player 2
in violation of EFX.
One might hope that this could be remedied by assuming that all players have the same value for
the entire set of goods (or rescaling valuations as necessary if this is not the case). Unfortunately,
the set of additive valuations given by Figure 5 thwarts this hope.
a b c d
player 1 14 3 2 1
player 2 7 6 4 3
player 3 20 0 0 0
Figure 5: An example where the leximin++ solution fails to be EFX even when all players have
the same value for the entire set of goods.
We claim that the allocation A = ({b, d}, {c}, {a}) is the only allocation where all players have
utility at least 4. To see this, first observe that good a must go to player 3, or player 3 has zero
utility. Then the only way to give players 1 and 2 each utility at least 4 is to give {b, d} to player
1 and {c} to player 2.
Since A is the only allocation which gives all players utility at least 4, A must be the leximin++
solution. However, A is not EFX, because v2({c}) < v2({b, d}\{d}).
We mentioned at the beginning of this section that the leximin solution is trivially PO. The
leximin++ solution does not share this guarantee. Indeed, this is necessary in order for the lex-
imin++ solution to be EFX, since it is impossible to simultaneously guarantee EFX and Pareto
optimality, even for identical valuations (Theorem 5.2). However, that example relies on zero value
goods. We will show in the next section that if zero value goods are disallowed, the leximin solution
becomes EFX as well as PO in two contexts.
5 Pareto optimality
In this section, we examine when EFX and Pareto optimality can be guaranteed simultaneously.
We begin by showing that if a player is wholly indifferent to a good being added to her bundle
(zero marginal utility), EFX and Pareto optimality can be mutually exclusive even in simple cases.
Theorem 5.1. If zero marginal utility is allowed, there exist additive valuations where no EFX
allocation is also PO, even for two players.
Proof. Consider the following additive valuations:
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a b c
player 1 2 1 0
player 2 2 0 1
Since v1({c}) = 0 but v2({c}) > 0, c ∈ A2 in any PO allocation. Similarly, b ∈ A1 in any PO
allocation.
By symmetry, assume without loss of generality that a ∈ A1, so A1 = {a, b} and A2 = {c}.
Then v2({c}) = 1, but v2(A1\{b}) = v2({a}) = 2, so the allocation is not EFX.
Therefore no allocation is both EFX and PO.
A similar example exists for general and identical valuations. This example was also used in
Section 4 to show that the leximin solution may not be EFX when zero marginal utility is allowed.
Theorem 5.2. If zero marginal utility is allowed, there exist general and identical valuations where
no EFX allocation is also PO, even for two players.
Proof. Consider two players with the same valuation v, and two goods a and b. Define v by
v(S) =


0 if S = {a}
1 if S = {b}
2 if S = {a, b}
By symmetry, assume without loss of generality that b ∈ A1. If A1 = {a, b}, then v(A2) = v(∅) = 0,
but v(A1\{a}) = v({b}) > 0, so the allocation is not EFX.
Therefore in any EFX allocation, a ∈ A2. But v({a}) = v(∅) = 0 and v({a, b}) > v({b}). Thus
giving a to player 1 strictly increases player 1’s value, without changing player 2’s value, so the
allocation is not PO.
Therefore no allocation is both EFX and PO.
On the other hand, if valuations are required to be additive and identical, it is possible to
guarantee EFX and Pareto optimality simultaneously, even with zero marginal utility. However,
this is an extremely restrictive setting that we mention mostly for completeness; we consider this
a very minor result. The proof of Theorem 5.3 appears in Section A of the appendix.
Theorem 5.3. For additive and identical valuations, there exists an allocation that is both EFX
and PO (even allowing zero marginal utility).
5.1 Nonzero marginal utility
The negative results of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 both break down if players are assumed to
have strictly positive utility for any good being added to their bundle. Formally, we say that a
valuation v has nonzero marginal utility if for every set S ⊂ [m] and g 6∈ S, v(S ∪ {g})− v(S) > 0.
We feel that this is a reasonable assumption in practice, as v(S ∪ {g}) − v(S) is allowed to be
arbitrarily small, and one might expect players in real world situations to always prefer to have a
good than not.
5.1.1 Positive results from leximin
Under the assumption of nonzero marginal utility, the leximin solution is guaranteed to be both
EFX and PO for any number of players with general but identical valuations, and for two players
with (possibly distinct) additive valuations.
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Theorem 5.4. For general but identical valuations with nonzero marginal utility, the leximin so-
lution is EFX and PO.
Proof. We follow a very similar analysis to the proof of Theorem 4.2. Let A be an allocation that
is not EFX. Then there exist players i, j and g ∈ Aj where v(Ai) < v(Aj\{g}). Again assume
without loss of generality that i = argmink v(Ak), and if there are multiple players with minimum
utility in A, let i be the one considered last in the ordering XA.
Define the same new allocation B where Bi = Ai ∪ {g}, Bj = Aj\{g}, and Bk = Ak for all
k 6∈ {i, j}. When zero marginal utility is allowed, the leximin++ modification of considering bundle
size is necessary because otherwise if vi(Bi) = vi(Ai), it could be the case that B ≺ A. When zero
marginal utility is disallowed, this modification is not necessary because vi(Bi) > vi(Ai) always.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 can be used nearly verbatim to show that A ≺ B (simply omit the
sentences handling the case where v(Bi) = v(Ai), since we now have v(Bi) > v(Ai), due to the
nonzero marginal utility of v). Thus A is not the leximin solution, so the leximin solution is EFX.
As noted before, the leximin solution is trivially Pareto optimal, since if any player could be
made better off without hurting any other player, that new allocation would be strictly larger under
≺.
We now show that assuming nonzero marginal utility, the leximin solution is EFX and PO
for two players with additive valuations. For this theorem, we will assume that vi([m]) = 1 for
all i: were this not the case, we could easily define v′i(S) = vi(S)/vi([m]), and find the leximin
solution according to v′. Additivity is necessary for Theorem 5.5 so that vi(A1) < vi(A2) implies
vi(A1) < 1/2, and so that vi(A1) ≥ vi(A2) implies vi(A1) ≥ 1/2.
The proof is similar to those of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 5.4, in that we consider an arbitrary
allocation A that is not EFX, and show that it cannot be the leximin solution by constructing an
allocation B such that A ≺ B. However, the allocation B is constructed differently here.
Theorem 5.5. For two players with additive valuations (not necessarily identical) with nonzero
marginal utility, the leximin solution is EFX and PO.
Proof. Let A be an allocation that is not EFX. Then there exist players i, j and g ∈ Aj where
vi(Ai) < vi(Aj\{g}). Without loss of generality, assume i = 1 and j = 2.
We know that v1(A1) < v1(A2), so v1(A1) < 1/2. If v2(A2) < v2(A1), the players could swap
bundles to increase both of their utilities, so A could not be the leximin solution. Therefore assume
v2(A2) ≥ v2(A1), and so v2(A2) ≥ 1/2.
Define two new bundles S1 = A1∪{g} and S2 = A2\{g}. Then define a new allocation B where
B1 = argmin
S∈{S1,S2}
v2(S) and B2 = argmax
S∈{S1,S2}
v2(S).
Since player 2 received her favorite of S1 and S2, we still have v2(B2) ≥ 1/2. We have v1(S2) =
v1(A2\{g}) > v1(A1) by our original assumption that A is not EFX, and we have v1(S1) = v1(A1∪
{g}) > v1(A1) by the nonzero marginal utility of v1. Therefore regardless of which bundle player 1
receives, v1(B1) > v1(A1).
Thus B has a higher minimum utility than A, so A cannot be the leximin solution. Therefore
the leximin solution is EFX in this setting, and it remains trivially PO.
Assuming nonzero marginal utility, Theorem 5.5 provides stronger guarantees than the currently
deployed algorithm on Spliddit, which only guarantees an EF1 and PO allocation. As described in
Section 1.3.4, this manifests even in simple cases.
We also argue that the assumption of nonzero marginal utility is particularly reasonable in the
case of two players with additive valuations, since if a player is truly indifferent to some good,
perhaps that good could simply be given to the other player and excluded from the fair division
process entirely.
5.1.2 Counterexample for two players with general valuations
Finally, we show that EFX and Pareto optimality cannot be guaranteed simultaneously for general
and distinct valuations, even with the assumption of nonzero marginal utility.
Theorem 5.6. There exist general valuations where no EFX allocation is also PO, even for two
players with nonzero marginal utility.
Proof. We construct a set of valuations for which there is no EFX allocation that is also PO.
Let n = 2 and M = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let α1 = {a}, β1 = {b, d}, γ1 = {a, c, d} and α2 = {b}, β2 =
{a, d}, γ2 = {b, d, e}. The key properties will be α1 ⊂ β2 ⊂ γ1 and α2 ⊂ β1 ⊂ γ2.
Define each player’s valuation vi by
vi(S) =


3 + ǫ(|S| − 3) if γi ⊆ S
2 + ǫ(|S| − 2) if βi ⊆ S and γi 6⊆ S
1 + ǫ(|S| − 1) if αi ⊆ S and βi, γi 6⊆ S
ǫ|S| otherwise
where ǫ is some small positive value (.1 would suffice). Adding a good to a bundle always increases
the value of the bundle by at least ǫ, so vi satisfies nonzero marginal utility. Also, note that the
valuations are symmetric across players, since αi, βi, and γi are symmetric across players.
We have the following implications:
γi 6⊆ S =⇒ vi(S) < 3
βi, γi 6⊆ S =⇒ vi(S) < 2
αi, βi, γi 6⊆ S =⇒ vi(S) < 1
By Theorem 4.3, an EFX allocation A = (A1, A2) must exist. Suppose γi ⊆ Ai for some
i: by symmetry, suppose i = 1. Since β1 ∩ β2 ∩ γ1 ∩ γ2 = {d} 6= ∅, we have β2, γ2 6⊆ A2,
so v2(A2) < 2. Furthermore, β2 is a strict subset of A1: specifically, β2 ⊆ A1\{c}. Therefore
v2(A1\{c}) ≥ v2(β2) = 2, which is strictly larger than v2(A2). Therefore if γi ⊆ Ai for either i, A
is not EFX.
Now suppose βi ⊆ Ai for some i: again suppose i = 1. Similarly, β2, γ2 6⊆ A2. In this case,
we also have α2 6⊆ A2, since α2 ∩ β1 6= ∅. Therefore v2(A2) < 1. Since α2 ⊆ A1\{d}, we have
v2(A1\{d}) ≥ v2(α1) = 1, which is strictly larger than v2(A2). Therefore if βi ⊆ Ai for either i, A
is not EFX. Since A is EFX by assumption, we have βi, γi 6⊆ Ai for both i, and so vi(Ai) < 2 for
both i.
We next claim that αi ⊆ Ai for both i. Suppose α1 6⊆ A1: then α1 ⊆ A2. Therefore v1(A1) < 1,
and v1(A2) ≥ 1, so player 1 envies player 2. If there exists g ∈ A2\α1, then g could be removed
and player 1 would still envy player 2. Thus if |A2| ≥ 2, A is not EFX, so we have |A2| = 1. But
then α2 ⊆ A1 and |A1| ≥ 2, so player 1 is envied in violation of EFX. Thus we have α1 ⊆ A1, and
by symmetry, α2 ⊆ A2.
One of the players has at least three goods; by symmetry, suppose |A1| ≥ 3. Since α1 ⊆ A1 and
β1, γ1, α2 6⊆ A1, we have A1 = {a, c, e} and A2 = {b, d}.
Consider the allocation B = (B1, B2) = ({a, c, d}, {b, e}). Player 2 is indifferent between {b, d}
and {b, e}, so v2(B2) = v2(A2). But γ1 ⊆ B1, so v1(B1) > v(A1). Thus player 1 is strictly better
off in B, and no player is worse off. Therefore A is not PO, and so no EFX allocation is PO.
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One last attempt to salvage EFX and PO in this setting might be to require a strict ranking
over bundles, i.e., not allow player 2 to be indifferent between {b, d} and {b, e}. However, even that
would not work, because we can easily set v2({b, e}) > v2({b, d}), in which case both players are
strictly better off in B.
This counterexample and our query complexity lower bound show that EFX is a very demanding
fairness property, even for two players. In the next section, we complement these negative results
by showing that an approximate version of EFX is satisfiable for any number of players with
subadditive valuations.
6 Existence of 12-EFX allocations for subadditive valuations
The possible existence of EFX allocations for possibly distinct valuations and n ≥ 3 remains an
open question, even for additive valuations. However, we are able to achieve an approximate version
of EFX, for any number of players with (possibly distinct) subadditive valuations. Recall that an
allocation A is c-EFX if for all i, j, and for all g ∈ Aj , vi(Ai) ≥ c · vi(Aj\{g}). In words, an
allocation is c-EFX if for all i, j, and g ∈ Aj , i’s value for her own bundle is at least c times her
value for j’s bundle after removing g. For example, 1-EFX is equivalent to standard EFX. In this
section, we give an algorithm that is guaranteed to return a 12 -EFX allocation for any number of
players with subadditive valuations.
To describe our algorithm, we must first define the envy graph. The envy graph of an allocation
A has a vertex for each player, and a directed edge from i to j if player i envies player j. Here we
mean full envy (i.e. vi(Ai) < vi(Aj)), not just envy in violation of EFX. It will be necessary for
the envy graph in our algorithm to be acyclic; we now show that we can always ensure this. The
following lemma is adapted from Lipton et al. [20].
Lemma 6.1. Let A = (A1, A2...An) be a c-EFX allocation with envy graph G = (V,E), where G
contains a cycle. Then there exists another allocation B = (B1, B2...Bn) with envy graph H where
B is also c-EFX, and H has no cycles.
Proof. We first show that there exists another c-EFX allocation A′ = (A′1...A
′
n) with envy graph
G′, where G′ has strictly fewer edges than G.
Let c = (1, 2...|c|) be a cycle in G. Thus vi(Ai) < vi(A(i mod |c|)+1) for all i ∈ c. Define a new
allocation A′ where A′i = A(i mod |c|)+1 for all i, and let G
′ = (V ′, E′) be the envy graph for A′. It
is clear that A′ is a permutation of A.
Suppose A′ is not c-EFX: then there exist i, j ∈ N and g ∈ A′j where vi(A
′) < c · vi(A
′
j\{g}).
Since A′ is a permutation of A, there exists k ∈ N where Ak = A
′
j , so vi(A
′
i) < c · vi(Ak\{g}).
Observe that vi(A
′
i) > vi(Ai) if i ∈ c, and vi(A
′
i) = vi(Ai) otherwise. Thus vi(Ai) ≤ vi(A
′
i) <
c · vi(Ak\{g}), and so A is also not c-EFX. Therefore if A is c-EFX, then A
′ is also c-EFX.
Note that the number of edges from V ′\c into c is unchanged. Also, the number of edges from
c into V ′\c has decreased or stayed the same, since the utility of every player in c has strictly
increased. Furthermore, for each i ∈ c, the number of players in c whom i envies has decreased by
at least one. This shows that G′ has strictly fewer edges than G.
If G′ still contains a cycle, we can apply this process again to obtain G′′, G′′′, and so on. Since
the number of edges strictly decreases each time, we can apply this process at most |E| times before
we obtain a envy graph without a cycle.
Algorithm 3 gives pseudocode for our algorithm. Initially all goods are in the pool P , and we
proceed in rounds until P is empty, maintaining the invariant that the partial allocation at the end
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Algorithm 3 Find an 12 -EFX allocation for n players with subadditive valuations
1: function GetApxEFXAllocation(n,m, (v1...vn))
2: P ← [m] ⊲ Initially, all goods are in the pool
3: for each i ∈ [n] do
4: Ai ← ∅
5: while P 6= ∅ do
6: g∗ ← pop(P ) ⊲ Remove an arbitrary good from P ,
7: j ← FindUnenviedPlayer(A1, A2...An) ⊲ and give it to an unenvied player
8: Aj ← Aj ∪ {g
∗}
9: if ∃i ∈ [n], g ∈ Aj such that vi(Ai) <
1
2vi(Aj\{g}) then
10: P ← P ∪Ai ⊲ Return i’s old allocation to the pool,
11: Aj ← Aj\{g
∗} ⊲ and give i just {g∗}
12: Ai ← {g
∗}
13: (A1, A2...An)← EliminateEnvyCycles(A1, A2...An) ⊲ Ensure the envy graph is acyclic
14: return (A1, A2...An)
of each round is EFX. The function EliminateEnvyCycles uses Lemma 6.1 to ensure that the graph
at the beginning of each round is acyclic. Since the envy graph is acyclic, we can always find an
unenvied player j, and give an arbitrary good g∗ from P to her.
It is possible that this will cause another player i to envy j in violation of 12 -EFX. In this case,
we return all of i’s current bundle to P , and let i’s new bundle be just {g∗}. The key insight is that
in order for i to go from not envying j to envying j in violation of 12 -EFX, adding g
∗ to Aj must
have caused vi(Aj) to at least double. We will use that fact, along with the subadditivity of vi,
to show that vi({g
∗}) must be larger than i’s value for her bundle at the beginning of the round.
Thus if i envies any player, it remains consistent with 12 -EFX. Any envy directed towards i will be
fully EFX, since i will only have one good.
On each round, either P decreases in size (in the case where g∗ remains with j), or the sum
of utilities increases (in the case where g∗ is instead given to i because i envies j in violation of
1
2 -EFX). Thus we can use a potential function argument to show that Algorithm 3 terminates
(although it may take a non-polynomial number of rounds).
Theorem 6.1. For subadditive valuations, Algorithm 3 returns a 12 -EFX allocation.
Proof. We refer to each iteration of the while-loop as a round. We first show that the partial
allocation at the end of each round is 12 -EFX. Then we will show that the algorithm is guaranteed
to terminate.
Let Aℓk be the bundle of player k at the beginning of round ℓ, and let B
ℓ
k denote the bundle of
player k just before EliminateEnvyCycles is run on round ℓ. Let Aℓ = (Aℓ1...A
ℓ
n) andB
ℓ = (Bℓ1...B
ℓ
n).
In this proof, we use k and k′ to denote a generic player; i and j refer exclusively to the variables
in the while-loop.
We proceed by induction on ℓ. Initially, all players have empty bundles, which trivially satisfies
1
2 -EFX. Thus assume the partial allocation at the beginning of round ℓ is
1
2 -EFX. We will show
that the partial allocation at the beginning of round ℓ+ 1 is 12 -EFX. The partial allocation at the
beginning of round ℓ+1 Aℓ+1 is equal to EliminateEnvyCycles(Bℓ). Thus by Lemma 6.1, it suffices
to show that Bℓ is 12 -EFX.
If the body of the if-statement (lines 10-12) is not executed, the allocation Bℓ is 12 -EFX by
definition. Thus assume the body of the if-statement is executed. Then Bℓj = A
ℓ
j, because g
∗ was
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added and then removed. Thus for all k 6= i, Bℓk = A
ℓ
k.
We say that a pair (k, k′) is 12 -EFX in B
ℓ if v(Bℓk) ≥
1
2v(Bk′\{g}) for all g ∈ B
ℓ
k′ . We know that
Aℓ is 12 -EFX by assumption. Therefore since B
ℓ
k = A
ℓ
k for all k 6= i, all pairs (k, k
′) where k 6= i and
k′ 6= i remain 12 -EFX in B
ℓ. Furthermore, since Bℓi = {g
∗}, the pair (k, i) is 12 -EFX for all players
k, since Bℓi \{g} = ∅ for all g ∈ B
ℓ
i .
It remains only to show that the pairs (i, k) are 12 -EFX for all players k. We do this by showing
that vi(B
ℓ
i ) > vi(A
ℓ
i). The fact that this inequality is strict will be important later in showing that
the algorithm terminates.
We know that j was unenvied at the beginning of round ℓ, so vi(A
ℓ
i) ≥ vi(A
ℓ
j). Since the body
of the if-statement executed, we also know that there exists g ∈ Aℓj ∪ {g
∗} such that vi(A
ℓ
i) <
1
2vi(A
ℓ
j ∪ {g
∗}\{g}). Thus vi(A
ℓ
i) <
1
2vi(A
ℓ
j ∪ {g
∗}), which will be all we need. Therefore,
vi(A
ℓ
i) <
1
2
vi(A
ℓ
j ∪ {g
∗}) (1)
≤
1
2
(vi(A
ℓ
j) + vi({g
∗})) (2)
≤
1
2
(vi(A
ℓ
i) + vi({g
∗})) (3)
where 2 follows from 1 due to vi being subadditive, and 3 follows from 2 due to vi(A
ℓ
i) ≥ vi(A
ℓ
j).
Therefore,
vi(A
ℓ
i)−
1
2
vi(A
ℓ
i) <
1
2
vi({g
∗})
vi(A
ℓ
i) < vi({g
∗})
vi(A
ℓ
i) < vi(B
ℓ
i )
Consider an arbitrary player k 6= i. Since Aℓ is 12 -EFX, we have vi(A
ℓ
i) ≥
1
2vi(A
ℓ
k\{g}) for all
g ∈ Aℓk. Since vi(B
ℓ
i ) > vi(A
ℓ
i) and B
ℓ
k = A
ℓ
k for all k 6= i, we have vi(B
ℓ
i ) ≥
1
2vi(B
ℓ
k\{g}) for all
g ∈ Bℓk as well. Therefore the pair (i, k) is
1
2 -EFX for all players k.
Thus every pair of players is 12 -EFX in B
ℓ, so Bℓ is 12 -EFX. This shows that the partial allocation
at the end of each round is 12 -EFX, and so any allocation returned by the algorithm is
1
2 -EFX.
It remains to show that Algorithm 3 terminates. We use a potential function argument. For
round ℓ, define
φ(ℓ) =
n∑
k=1
v(Aℓk).
We noted above that if round ℓ falls under Case 2, only i’s bundle changes, and we have the strict
inequality vi(B
ℓ
i ) > vi(A
ℓ
i). Therefore vi(A
ℓ+1
i ) > vi(A
ℓ
i). Thus if round ℓ falls under Case 2, we
have φ(ℓ+ 1)− φ(ℓ) > 0.
If round ℓ falls under Case 1, only j’s bundle changes, and we have vj(A
ℓ+1
j ) ≥ vi(A
ℓ
i). Therefore
if round ℓ falls under Case 1, we have φ(ℓ+ 1)− φ(ℓ) ≥ 0.
In any round which falls under Case 1, |P | decreases by one. Therefore if m rounds pass without
Case 2 occurring, P becomes empty, and the algorithm terminates. Thus while the algorithm has
not terminated, Case 2 must occur at least once every m rounds, and so φ(ℓ +m) − φ(ℓ) > 0 for
all ℓ.
The number of possible partial allocations is at most (n+ 1)m: each good can be given to one
of the n players, or left in the unallocated pool. Thus the number of distinct values φ can take on
is at most (n+1)m, and so φ can increase at most that many times. Thus after m(n+1)m rounds,
the algorithm must have terminated.
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Finally, we briefly show that 12 -EFX and EF1 are incomparable, meaning that neither property
implies the other. Recall that an allocation A is EF1 if for all i, j where Aj 6= ∅, there exists g ∈ Aj
where vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj\{g}).
Consider the additive valuations on the left, and let A = ({a, b}, {c}). A is EF1 because
v2(A2) ≥ v2(A1\{a}), but A is not
1
2 -EFX because v2(A2) <
1
2v2(A1\{b}).
Now consider the valuations on the right, and let A = ({a, b, c}, {d}). Then A is not EF1,
because v2(A2) < v2(A1\{g}) for all g ∈ A1, but A is
1
2 -EFX, because v2(A2) ≥
1
2v2(A1\{g}) for
all g ∈ A1.
a b c
player 1 3 1 0
player 2 3 0 1
a b c d
player 1 1 1 1 1
player 2 1 1 1 1
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we provided the first general results on the fairness concept of envy-freeness up to
any good. Our most technically involved result was an exponential lower bound on the number of
queries required by any deterministic algorithm to find an EFX allocation, via a reduction from
local search. To complete the lower bound, we proved an exponential lower bound on the number of
queries required to find a local maximum onK(2k+1, k). We used results from Dinh and Russell [13]
and Valencia-Pabon and Vera [30] to obtain an exponential lower bound for randomized algorithms
as well. Our EFX lower bounds hold even for two players with identical submodular valuations.
Next, we showed that for n players with general but identical valuations, a modification of the
leximin solution is guaranteed to be EFX. We showed how this result can be adapted into a cut-
and-choose protocol for finding an EFX allocation between two players with general and possibly
distinct valuations.
We also considered satisfying EFX and Pareto optimality together. We showed that if players are
allowed to have zero value for a good being added to their bundle, it is impossible to guarantee EFX
and Pareto optimality simultaneously. However, if we assume that a player’s value for her bundle is
strictly increased by adding any good (even just by some tiny ǫ), the leximin solution is EFX and PO
two settings: for n players with general but identical valuations, and for two players with possibly
distinct additive valuations. We view the latter result as our result of most practical significance:
assuming nonzero marginal utility, it provides stronger guarantees the currently deployed algorithm
on Spliddit, even in simple examples. Our other significant positive result was an algorithm for
finding a 12 -EFX allocation for any number of players with subadditive valuations.
The ideal next step would be to consider EFX with distinct valuations and more than two
players. This problem seems quite challenging, even for the special case of additive valuations.
Indeed, Caragiannis et al. [10] were unable to settle the question of whether EFX allocations in
that context always exist, “despite significant effort.” The problem seems highly non-trivial even
for three players with different additive valuations. We suspect that at least for general valuations,
there exist instances where no EFX allocation exists, and it may be easier to find a counterexample
in that setting. Similarly, finding a counterexample to EFX and Pareto optimality together for
additive valuations and more than two players (assuming nonzero marginal utility) is another
avenue that may be more tractable.
Another direction is to pursue stronger lower bounds for finding an EFX allocation. In par-
ticular, communication complexity allows players unlimited computation and queries, and only
measures the number of bits transmitted. The cut-and-choose protocol from Section 4 constitutes
a linear communication protocol for two players with general and possibly distinct valuations to
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compute an EFX allocation, so any communication complexity lower bound would need to consider
more than two players. On the other hand, we know finding an EFX allocation to be hard in the
query model even for two players, which suggests an interesting separation.
More generally, communication complexity is one example of a topic that has been studied in
algorithmic mechanism design and may be useful in the study of fair division. Another such topic
is the hierarchy of complement-free valuations (additive, submodular, subadditive, etc.). Our work
already implies separations between these valuation classes from a fair division perspective, and
suggests that fair division with different classes of player valuations deserves further study.
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A Additional proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1. To show that ≺++, we need to show that for any allocations A,B, and C,
A ≺++ A is false, and that (A ≺++ B and B ≺++ C) implies A ≺++ C.
We first show that A ≺++ A is false. The key fact is that for a given allocation A, there is
only one possible ordering of the players XA: were this not true, ≺++ could fail to produce a total
ordering.14 Therefore on each iteration, the same player is considered from each copy of A. Thus
on each iteration, the two bundles compared will be the same, so A ≺++ A never terminates until
it passes through all ℓ ∈ [n] and returns false at the very end.
It remains to show that (A ≺++ B and B ≺++ C) implies A ≺++ C. Suppose A ≺++ B and
B ≺++ C. Let ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ3 be the iterations on which A ≺++ B, B ≺++ C and A ≺++ C
terminate, respectively. For x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let ix = X
A
ℓx
, jx = X
B
ℓx
, and kx = X
C
ℓx
.
Since A ≺++ B terminates on iteration ℓ1, we have v(Ai1) < v(Bj1) or |Ai1 | < |Bj1 |. Similarly,
since B ≺++ C terminates on iteration ℓ2, we have v(Bi2) < v(Cj2) or |Bi2 | < |Cj2 |.
First we argue that ℓ3 ≥ min(ℓ1, ℓ2). Suppose ℓ < min(ℓ1, ℓ2): then A ≺++ B and B ≺++ C do
not terminate until after iteration ℓ3. Therefore v(Ai3) = v(Bj3), |Ai3 | = |Bj3 |, v(Bj3) = v(Ck3),
and |Bj3 | = |Ck3 |. Therefore v(Ai3) = v(Ck3) and |Ai3 | = |Ck3 |, so A ≺++ C could not have
terminated on iteration ℓ3, which is a contradiction. Therefore ℓ3 ≥ min(ℓ1, ℓ2). We proceed by
case analysis.
Case 1: ℓ1 < ℓ2. Since B ≺++ C did not terminate until after iteration ℓ1, we have v(Bj1) =
v(Ck1) and |Bj1 | = |Ck1 |. Therefore v(Ai1) < v(Ck1) or |Ai1 | < |Ck1 |. We know that A ≺++ C
cannot have terminated prior to ℓ1, since ℓ3 ≥ min(ℓ1, ℓ2) = ℓ1. Therefore A ≺++ C will terminate
on iteration ℓ1 and return true, so A ≺++ C holds in Case 1.
Case 2: ℓ2 < ℓ1. This case is similar. Since A ≺++ B did not terminate until after iteration ℓ2,
we have v(Ai2) = v(Bj2) and |Ai2 | = |Bj2 |. Therefore v(Ai2) < v(Ck2) or |Ai2 | < |Ck2 |. We know
that A ≺++ C cannot have terminated prior to ℓ2, since ℓ3 ≥ min(ℓ1, ℓ2) = ℓ2. Therefore A ≺++ C
will terminate on iteration ℓ2 and return true, so A ≺++ C holds Case 2.
Case 3: ℓ1 = ℓ2. In this case we have i1 = i2, j1 = j2, and k1 = k2. Therefore
v(Ai1) < v(Bj1) or
(
v(Ai1) = v(Bj1) and |Ai1 | < |Bj1 |
)
, and
v(Bj1) < v(Ck1) or
(
v(Bj1) = v(Ck1) and |Bj1 | < |Ck1 |
)
14Consider two players with identical valuations and one good a, where v({a}) = 0. Let A = (∅, {a}). Suppose
both (1,2) and (2,1) are valid orderings of the players according to A, and suppose we run A ≺++ A with the left
hand side A using the ordering (1,2) and the right hand side A using (2,1). Then at ℓ = 1, ∅ from the left hand side
A will be compared with {a} from the right hand side A, and A ≺++ A will return true.
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Note that v(Ai1) ≤ v(Bj1) and v(Bj1) ≤ v(Ck1). Therefore if either v(Ai1) < v(Bj1) or v(Bj1) <
v(Ck1), we have v(Ai1) < v(Ck1). We know A ≺++ C cannot have terminated before ℓ1 = ℓ2 since
ℓ3 ≥ min(ℓ1, ℓ2), so if v(Ai1) < v(Ck1), A ≺++ C terminates on iteration ℓ1 and returns true.
Thus assume v(Ai1) = v(Bj1) and v(Bj1) = v(Ck1): then |Ai1 | < |Bj1 | and |Bj1 | < |Ck1 |.
Therefore v(Ai1) = v(Ck1) and |Ai1 | < |Ck1 |, so A ≺++ C terminates on iteration ℓ1 and returns
true. Therefore A ≺++ C in Case 3. This shows that (A ≺++ B and B ≺++ C) implies A ≺++ C,
and completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let Z be the set of all goods g where v({g}) = 0. Therefore for all g ∈
M\{Z}, we have v({g}) > 0, so v has nonzero marginal utility over the set of goods M\{Z}.
Let A = (A1...An) be the leximin allocation over M\{Z}. By Theorem 5.4, A is EFX and PO
over M\{Z}.
Let i be the minimum utility player in A. Define a new allocation B over all of M where
Bi = Ai ∪ {Z} and Bj = Aj for all j 6= i. Since v(Z) = 0, we have v(Bj) = v(Aj) for all j.
Therefore since i had minimum utility in A, i also has minimum utility in B.
To see that B is EFX, consider arbitrary players j and k, and any g ∈ Bk. If i 6= k, we have
Ak = Bk. Since A is EFX, we have v(Bj) = v(Aj) ≥ v(Ak\{g}) = v(Bk\{g}). If i = k, then
v(Bj) ≥ v(Bk) ≥ v(Bk\{g}), since i has minimum utility in B. This shows that B is EFX.
To see that B is PO, observe that the way the goods in Z are allocated has no effect on the
values of the bundles. Therefore the goods in Z have no effect on the Pareto optimality of the
allocation, so the Pareto optimality of B follows directly from the Pareto optimality of A.
B A setting where an EFX allocation can be computed quickly
Finally, we describe a setting in which an EFX allocation always exists and can be computed
in polynomial time (counting both the value queries and all additional computation done by an
algorithm). Our result will hold when players have additive valuations with identical rankings,
meaning that all players agree on the relative ordering of individual goods. This is, for all players i
and j, and for all goods g1 and g2, vi(g1) ≥ vi(g2) whenever vj(g1) ≥ vj(g2). This will also yield a
polynomial time algorithm for computing an EFX allocation for two players with additive (possibly
distinct) valuations.
Requiring identical rankings is not as strong as requiring identical valuations. For example, let
v1(g1) = 1, v1(g2) = 2, v1(g3) = 4 and v2(g1) = 2, v2(g2) = 3, v2(g3) = 4. Then the rankings are
identical, but v1({g1, g2}) < v1(g3), whereas v2({g1, g2}) > v2(g3).
While strong, there are certainly real-world contexts where this assumption makes sense. For
example, if the goods are apartments (with differing square footage), airline tickets (with differing
numbers of stops and classes of service), or baseball pitchers (with differing statistics), it is plausible
that buyers generally agree on which goods are more valuable than others, but disagree on the exact
values of these goods.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 4) is reminiscent of our algorithm for finding a 12 -EFX allocation for
any number of players with subadditive valuations from Section 6, in that we allocate the goods in
rounds and ensure that the envy graph is acyclic at the beginning of each round. However, here
we never return goods to the pool, and allocate the goods in descending order of value.
Recall that Lemma 6.1 gives a process that can be used to ensure the envy graph is acyclic:
if an envy cycle exists, bundles can be permuted along this cycle such the number of edges in the
envy graph decreases by at least one. The function EliminateEnvyCycles repeatedly performs this
process until the envy graph is acyclic.
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Algorithm 4 Find an EFX allocation for additive valuations with identical ranking
1: function GetEFXAllocationSameRanking(n,m, (v1...vn))
2: P ← Sorted([m]) ⊲ Sort in descending order: P1 = max(P )
3: for each i ∈ [n] do
4: Ai ← ∅
5: for each i ∈ [m] do
6: j ← FindUnenviedPlayer(A1, A2...An)
7: Aj ← Aj ∪ {Pi}
8: (A1, A2...An)← EliminateEnvyCycles(A1, A2...An)
9: return (A1, A2...An)
Theorem B.1. For additive valuations with identical rankings, Algorithm 4 terminates with an
EFX allocation in O(mn3) time.
Proof. We first argue that at all times, vi(Aj)− vi(Ai) ≤ vi(g
∗) where g∗ is the good most recently
added to what is currently Aj . Since bundles may have been permuted by EliminateEnvyCycles, j
may not have been in possession of what is currently Aj at the time g
∗ was added. This does not
affect the proof, however: it is sufficient to interpret Aj as “the bundle that currently belongs to
j”. Thus instead of saying “i did not envy j at the time”, we will say “i did not envy Aj at the
time”.
Observe that a good is only allocated to a player whom no one envies. Thus directly before g∗
was added to Aj , i did not envy Aj: at that point vi(Aj) − vi(Ai) ≤ 0. Therefore directly after
g∗ was given to j, vi(Aj) − vi(Ai) ≤ vi(g
∗). Since vi(Ai) can only have grown since then, we have
vi(Aj)− vi(Ai) ≤ vi(g
∗) until a new good is added to Aj .
Since the goods are allocated in decreasing order of value, the good most recently added to Aj
must also be the least valuable good in Aj . Therefore at all times, vi(Aj)−vi(Ai) ≤ min
g∈Aj
vi(g), and
so vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) − min
g∈Aj
vi(g). For additive valuations, this is equivalent to vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj\{g})
for all g ∈ Aj . Therefore the allocation at all times is EFX, so the final allocation is EFX.
Finally, we show that Algorithm 4 terminates in O(mn3) time. Each time a good is allocated,
any edges added to the envy graph must point to the recipient. Thus at most n edges are added
to the envy graph on each round, and so at most mn edges are added to the graph over the course
of the algorithm. Each time a cycle is detected and bundles are permuted along that cycle using
Lemma 6.1, at least one edge is removed from the graph. Therefore this process is performed at
most mn times. Each time this process is performed, we may have to compute a large part of the
envy graph, which can take O(n2) time. Thus the overall running time bound is O(mn3).
This algorithm is easily generalizable to general valuations under the condition that all players
agree on a single ordering of the marginal values of the goods. Specifically, there must be an ordering
of the goods (g1, g2, . . . , gm) where for any set S, any player i, and all j, we have vi(S ∪ {gj}) ≥
vi(S ∪ {gj+1}). This ordering must be fixed across all sets S. Then instead of allocating goods in
descending order of value, we allocate goods in descending order of marginal value, and the analog
of Theorem B.1 holds, with essentially the same proof.
Finally, we note that Algorithm 4 can be used to compute an EFX allocation for two players
with additive (possibly distinct) valuations in polynomial time. We use a cut-and-choose argument
similar to that of Theorem 4.3: player 1 runs Algorithm 4 with two copies of herself to find an
allocation which will be EFX from her viewpoint, regardless of which bundle she receives. Then
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player 2 chooses her favorite bundle in the resulting allocation, so the allocation will be fully
envy-free from her viewpoint.
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